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Abstract Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expres-
sions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would
be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to
have a number of attractive features. I argue that that it threatens to make the mean-
ings of our words indeterminate and doesn’t do what it was that made a dispositional
view attractive in the first place.
Introduction
How do our terms come to mean what they do? A prima facie plausible idea is that
it has something to do with our dispositions to apply those terms. It is attractive to
say that what our terms mean has something to do with how we are, rather than being
due to completely external considerations. A dispositional account promises to do
justice to this idea without getting stuck with typical problems faced by traditional
internalists—although this is not a point I’ll defend here. Moreover, it can, if desired,
capture typical externalist intuitions, e.g., about Twin Earth, without giving up on the
 James Andow
jamesandow@gmail.com
1 University of Reading, Reading, UK
54 Philosophia (2016) 44:53–62
idea that what ultimately grounds the meaning of my words concerns facts about my
current state.1
A straightforward dispositional metasemantic account (SDA), however, doesn’t
withstand much scrutiny.
SDA: A linguistic expression E means some object, property, kind, relation,
etc., X, in the mouth of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S would be disposed
to apply E to X.
SDA faces two main problems: (1) it is very unclear what enables a single term E
to mean the same when I use it as when you use it for we surely have different dis-
positions to apply pretty much any term if only ever so slightly different; (2) SDA
threatens to make it almost impossible to misapply an expression for there’s no obvi-
ous sense to the idea that one might have applied an expression to something in
certain circumstances despite not being disposed to do so.
Recently a new variety of dispositional metasemantics has been proposed which
promises to overcome the problems faced by a more straightforward account such
as SDA. The next section outlines the account in question: the complete information
dispositional account. Then, in the rest of the paper, I argue that this account faces
a number of important objections and consider various ways one might attempt to
respond to these objections.2 Ultimately, I conclude that the complete information
dispositional account threatens to make the meanings of our words indeterminate and
loses track of what it was that made a dispositional view attractive in the first place.
CIDA
What sets a complete information dispositional account (CIDA) apart from SDA?
The difference is that, according to CIDA, meaning is grounded in speakers’ dispo-
sitions to apply terms given all relevant information or complete information rather
than their actual current dispositions.
CIDA: A linguistic expression E means some object, property, kind, relation,
etc., X, in the mouth of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S would be disposed
to apply E to X if S had all the relevant information.3
Basically CIDA is as SDA but with the following tweak: the relevant dispositions
are the dispositions S would have were they to have all relevant information or com-
plete information. What is this state of having all relevant information supposed to
1See Johnson and Nado (2014) for details.
2Some of these ideas elaborate on my remarks in Andow (2015) (a critical review of Booth and
Rowbottom 2014).
3This articulation is from Johnson and Nado (2014).
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be? The idea is that the relevant state is one in which there is no piece of information
apprisal of which would change S’s dispositions to apply the relevant term.
Before moving on, take note of an important feature of the view. This is a feature
which might not be immediately obvious. CIDA accepts that meaning is grounded
in speakers’ actual current dispositions. How is this so, given the appeal to the
counterfactual situation of having complete information? The reason is that disposi-
tions to apply a term given complete information are ultimately grounded in one’s
actual dispositions. The difference is that CIDA doesn’t focus simply on one’s actual
dispositions to apply the relevant terms (like SDA). To see this point, it helps to rec-
ognize a distinction between first and second order dispositions. Individuals have
certain dispositions to apply terms, i.e., first-order dispositions. An individual may
have second-order dispositions concerning these first-order dispositions. An individ-
ual may be disposed to change first-order dispositions in response to certain bits of
information and to retain their first-order dispositions in response to all other bits of
information. In other words, whether one would be disposed to apply a term given
complete information is a function of one’s actual current dispositions where this
includes both first and second order dispositions (modulo the precise contents of
‘complete information’).
While retaining this feature—accepting that meaning is grounded in speakers’ cur-
rent dispositions—CIDA seems equipped to deal with the issues faced by a more
straightforward dispositional account such as SDA. (1) CIDA has sensible things to
say about when two speakers mean the same thing when they use a term. For an
expression to mean the same in my mouth as yours is for us both to have second order
dispositions such that were we to have complete information we would have the same
first order dispositions to apply the expression. We might mean the same despite hav-
ing different first order dispositions. We might mean the same despite having differ-
ent second order dispositions (e.g., given different starting points). What unifies the
meanings of an expression as used by two individuals is that, given complete infor-
mation, their first-order dispositions would converge. (2) CIDA has sensible things to
say about the possibility of misusing terms. To misapply a term is easy, one’s actual
current first order dispositions are likely different from those one would have given
complete information, and wherever the two diverge, there is scope for misapplication.
One might worry that employing a counterfactual device—such as these very
well-informed speakers—would result in a view that fails to do justice to the intu-
itive motivation for considering any kind of a dispositional account in the first place.
The reason a dispositional account seems attractive is that it seems able to marry the
intuitive sense that meaning should be grounded in facts about the speaker without
getting into the difficulties associated with internalist accounts such as descriptivism.
That is to say, the advocate of a dispositional view thinks that it is not even remotely
plausible to think that the meaning of expressions as used by an individual is com-
pletely divorced from that individual’s current tendencies. However, fortunately, on
the face of it CIDA’s use of this counterfactual device manages to do justice to this
intuitive motivation. What makes it the case that some of my applications of ‘cow’
are correct whereas others are incorrect? For CIDA the answer concerns facts about
me now: facts about my dispositions to respond to further information of which I am
not currently aware.
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Johnson and Nado (2014) do a good job of extolling the virtues of CIDA in a
little more detail. I won’t do anymore to motivate CIDA or dispositional views more
generally here. Instead, in the following, I consider a number of potential objections
to views like CIDA.
Zebras
The first potential objection to CIDA concerns whether ‘S’s dispositions to apply E
given complete information’ picks out a determinate set of dispositions to apply E.
To explore this objection, it is helpful to consider CIDA’s relation to the (in some
respects) similar idea of temporal externalism. Temporal externalism is the view
that ‘the future behavior of an individual or his society can affect the content of his
thoughts and utterances’ (see Jackman 1999, 2005). One way Jackman describes tem-
poral externalism is to say that it involves deference to future experts (Jackman 2005).
This is a somewhat similar device to the idea of oneself and one’s first order disposi-
tions given complete information; both the future expert and the counterfactual you
have the benefit of knowing things which the actual current you does not.
Despite any similarity, the cases Jackman uses to motivate temporal externalism
in fact suggest a problem for CIDA. Jackman motivates temporal externalism by
appealing to various situations in which current meaning seems to depend on how
future dispositions to use particular terms would respond to particular findings. For
example,
The term ‘Grant’s zebra’ was introduced around 1820 for a type of zebra native
to Kenya. A few years later, the term ‘Chapman’s zebra’ was introduced for a
morphologically distinct type of zebra found in present-day Zimbabwe. Later
still it was discovered that the two types of zebra interbred near the Zambezi
River and that, morphologically, one gradually faded into the other. Grant’s
and Chapman’s zebras were thus both taken to be races of the species Equus
burchilli. However, while that was how our usage of the term actually devel-
oped, it seems likely that if the taxonomists had investigated the area around
the Zambezi River before they explored Zimbabwe, they would have “discov-
ered” that Grant’s zebra could be found through most of East Africa, gradually
changing into a different subspecies as it drifted south. In this counterfactual
scenario, ‘Grant’s zebra’ would have been applied to the entire species, not just
the race found in Kenya. (366)
The possibility that future discoveries might affect the content of current thoughts
and utterances is something which CIDA is happy to accept. That is not a problem
for CIDA. The discovered information is presumably part of the ‘complete informa-
tion’ which is packed into the idea of ‘dispositions given complete information’. The
potential problem is the fact that if one is going to accept that (a) the way one’s first
order dispositions would change given apprisal of new information is relevant to the
meaning of terms as you currently use them, then it is unclear on what grounds one
could resist Jackman’s claim that (b) the discovery of bits of information in different
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orders might affect the meaning of terms as you currently use them. Accepting (b)
looks problematic for CIDA, but CIDA is committed to (a).
Here’s one way to put the problem: if Jackman is right about cases like the zebra
case, the relevant individuals have no determinate dispositions given complete infor-
mation. So it seems that the notion of S’s dispositions given complete information
employed by CIDA may not fix a single set of dispositions. There is no obvious rea-
son to think that generally speaking I would be disposed to respond in the same way
to receiving complete information in order {i1, i2, i3 . . . in} and {i9, i7, i3 . . . }, for
instance. So, the worry might be, CIDA has no obvious way to resist the conclusion
that many (perhaps all) of my expressions have indeterminate meanings.4
I think the most plausible way for the proponent of CIDA to respond starts with
noting that the way I have expressed the problem might be thought unhelpful. Why?
Because it misses out on the fact that second order dispositions and the order of
learning information interact in order to change first order dispositions. Why is
this relevant? Because an individual given complete information is by definition in
possession of all information which would lead to a change in their first order dis-
positions. What the zebra case seems to suggest to me is that this information at
least potentially includes information about one’s second order dispositions and one’s
counterfactual selves. It does seem plausible, for example, that giving an individual
a chance to reflect on the ways that the order in which information is learned might
influence their first order dispositions, and this might in turn influence their first order
dispositions. For instance, the proponent of CIDA might try to say that on reflec-
tion the actual taxonomists would recognize that ‘Chapman’s’ and ‘Grant’s’ don’t
really pick out genuine groups and revise their taxonomy accordingly.5 Nonetheless,
it seems to me a little optimistic for the proponent of CIDA to think that in the clos-
est possible worlds in which the actual and counterfactual taxonomists are apprised
of each others’ paths of exploration and the effects on each others’ use of terms, the
two groups of taxonomists would converge in their first order dispositions.6
Intransigence
The second potential objection is somewhat similar. There are some other rea-
sons to think that we shouldn’t necessarily expect convergence given complete
4It is, of course, possible for the proponent of CIDA to bite the bullet here and accept that most of our
language might have indeterminate meaning and not just the bits we might have suspected, like obvious
instances of vagueness. My main point is simply to note that there is a large, although not by itself decisive,
theoretical cost to be associated with CIDA unless its proponent can provide an in principle reason to think
that these sorts of consideration do not apply in the case of most of our vocabulary.
5Many revisions in zebra taxonomy have in fact been made since the zebra case entered philosophical
discussion, see Groves and Bell (2004). Although, these changes have typically not been on the basis of
counterfactual speculation (as far as I can make out).
6Note that if they were to take this route then they couldn’t accept Jackman’s story about the meaning of the
actual and counterfactual taxonomists’ terminology. CIDA, as I have presented it, is not compatible with
temporal externalism. However, since, as Jackman admits, the general response to temporal externalism is
an incredulous stare, I take it that this is no huge theoretical burden for the proponent of CIDA to bear.
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information—even if CIDA can say something sensible about cases like Jackman
uses to motivate temporal externalism—and that CIDA might thus have the result
that many or all of our terms have indeterminate meanings.
The way we have been understanding ‘all relevant information’ or ‘complete
information’ is that one is in the relevant state with respect to an expression
if there is no new information which would change one’s dispositions to apply
the expression. Here’s another way to say the same thing. To have complete
information is to have intransigent dispositions. This is really just a relabeling
of the notion of ‘complete information’ being used. However, the relabeling is
useful as it draws attention to a feature of CIDA which one might not other-
wise see. The idea of ‘complete information’ might conjure the picture of some
single ideal epistemic state. But that isn’t quite right. We can see this by not-
ing that there might be multiple ways in which an individual might come to
have the intransigent dispositions which characterize the state of having ‘complete
information’.
First, take a toy example. Take someone who uses the word ‘God’ and who applies
‘God’ to the sun (and only the sun) due to some particular religious beliefs. Due to
other features of their overall belief set, their faith might be completely insensitive
to countervailing evidence, i.e., there might be no evidence or argument which could
possibly alter their dispositions to apply ‘God’. They have intransigent dispositions,
but we might not automatically have recognized them as appropriate recipients of the
label ‘in possession of all relevant information’.
Now, note that there are other, slightly less eccentric individuals who are in very
a similar position. For instance, there might be an individual who is not currently
in an intransigent position, but for whom certain bits of information would soon
place them in one, e.g., the information that leaders in her religion believe that
everyone else in the world is deliberately trying to mislead followers of the ‘true
faith’. For these slightly less eccentric individuals, note, there might bemultiple stop-
ping points open to them—multiple intransigent positions in which they could find
themselves. They are not doomed to be intransigent appliers of ‘God’ to the sun,
apprised of different information they could escape this fate, meaning that their dis-
positions given complete information, viz., first order dispositions once no further
piece of information would change their first order dispositions, would be rather
different.
The take-home message here is that one’s current first order dispositions and sec-
ond order dispositions are not guaranteed to fix a single set of first order dispositions
given complete information, because even for a particular individual, term, and time,
there can be more than one set of contents assigned to ‘complete information’. This
means that it is not guaranteed that our terms have determinate meanings. It is impor-
tant to note that this is a different worry than that considered in the previous section.
What threatens the determinacy of the meaning of our terms is not that what dis-
positions we have given complete information might be different depending on the
order in which we received information. Rather, the threat concerns the possibility
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that there is more than one set of information which would count as ‘complete’ for
a single individual, term and time. The potential sunworshipper’s future doesn’t go
one way or the other depending on in which order they become aware of some sin-
gle set of facts known as ‘complete information’. Rather, their future goes one way
or the other depending on which version of ‘complete information’ they receive. The
notion of ‘complete information’ or ‘all relevant information’ which CIDA invokes
isn’t quite what it seems: it doesn’t obviously always pick out a single epistemic posi-
tion even given a particular individual and their use of a particular term. ‘Complete
information’ or ‘all relevant information’ just picks out any informational state which
will render an individual intransigent in their dispositions.
I suspect the proponent of CIDA will want to respond to what I have said so far
along the following lines. Why can’t we treat the case of the potential sunworshipper
and similar cases as exceptions? They might provide a reason to think that the major-
ity of us are not in a similar situation. However, it is far from clear what principled
grounds there might be for assuming that for most language users and most of their
terms there is only a single set of true propositions which would constitute ‘com-
plete information’ and render them intransigent in their dispositions. Unless there is
some good reason to make this assumption it is on the cards that most of our terms
have indeterminate meanings (even setting aside the earlier issues about the order in
which information is presented). There may be principled considerations to which
the proponent of CIDA can appeal to at this point. However, until they do so, there is
a significant theoretical cost to be associated with their position.
How might the proponent of CIDA deal with this potential objection? (1) One nat-
ural approach might be to invoke a different notion of ‘complete information’ or ‘all
relevant information’ which can’t be captured simply in terms of a state in which
one’s first order dispositions are intransigent and which is decoupled from the idea
that relevant information is that information apprisal of which would lead to alter-
ations in your first order dispositions. But it seems that unless you also decouple
meaning from those aspects of us which mean that there are multiple intransigent
positions open to us (and, e.g., give a dispositional account in terms of some ideal-
ized agent with perfect information, perfect rationality, etc.) then it won’t solve the
problem. Moreover, once this decoupling takes place it is unclear in what sense CIDA
has any of the intuitive appeal dispositional views seemed to have, i.e., grounding
fact about the meaning of our words in facts about our actual tendencies. (2) Another
approach might be to offer something similar to the response I considered in the pre-
vious section. This might go as follows: all information which would change one’s
dispositions is relevant information; in these supposedly intransigent cases, the indi-
vidual’s dispositions are not really intransigent; upon consideration that there were
multiple other paths available to them (in some sense) which would also have resulted
in different (but also seemingly intransigent) positions, their first order dispositions
would change. This is a possible view. However, it remains to be seen why, in prin-
ciple, we should expect there to be only one intransigent position open to individuals
(at least in the vast majority of cases).
60 Philosophia (2016) 44:53–62
Semantic Apocalypse
Now for a slightly different worry. Above I said that you don’t want an account of
meaning which divorces the meaning of an individual’s term from that individual’s
current state. One might worry that CIDA falls foul of this desideratum, despite the
obvious sense in which CIDA grounds meaning in an individual’s current state.
This worry invokes the possibility of semantic apocalypse. Given complete infor-
mation, it is at least clear that some expressions will be abandoned. Take ‘phlogiston’.
Given the information we have, we take it to be non-referring. We have not aban-
doned it in the sense that many of us competently recognize what the world would
have to be like for it to apply and fail to apply it. Nonetheless, it has been abandoned
in the sense that new terms now have to be deployed in order to describe and explain
those phenomena in which ‘phlogiston’ was supposed to play a part.
The possibility of semantic apocalypse is the possibility that all or the vast major-
ity of our current vocabulary resembles the case of ‘phlogiston’. Clearly this is a
possibility. Unfortunately, it seems things are worse than that. Indeed, once we con-
sider the fact that CIDA invokes the notion of ‘complete information’, semantic
apocalypse seems somewhat probable. Consider that complete information is poten-
tially a lot of information. One doesn’t have complete information until there is no
fact (of which you remain unaware) apprisal of which would lead to any alteration
in one’s first order dispositions. One’s view of the world in such a state seems likely
to be very different from that we now have. Indeed, once given access to complete
information—viz., every single fact about reality which would change the way in
which we talk about it—it seems pretty likely that our entire conceptual framework
would be overhauled to the extent that the vast majority of expressions in our current
vocabulary would be abandoned or completely revised from the ground up.7 It seems
pretty likely that there is information out there which would radically restructure the
nature of human existence, make us abandon ways of life, abandon technologies,
reconsider our values and place in nature, information which would lead us to restruc-
ture the political organization of our species, reconsider national boundaries, and
the ‘artificial divisions’ which having distinct languages impose upon us. The likely
effect of complete information is semantic apocalypse. (Just to be clear – my claim
here is not that it is likely we will actually undergo such a shift. Who is to say what
volume of information humankind will become aware of before extinction? Rather,
the claim is that the probable result of being exposed to all information which would
alter one’s dispositions, i.e., complete information, would involve a radical overhaul
in semantic dispositions.)
Suppose I’m right that the likely effect of complete information is semantic apoc-
alypse. The implications of CIDA seem somewhat drastic. Our current vocabulary
would consist (almost entirely) of words whose meaning is grounded by the dispo-
sitions not to use the words to refer to anything; the apocalypse seems to simply
7For those familiar, the most dramatic case of this resembles something like Douglas Adams’ ‘Total
Perspective Vortex’ from The Hitchhikers’ Guide to the Galaxy.
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decimate our vocabulary—or, at least, that’s a melodramatic way to put it. Of course,
the proponent of CIDA can come back and tell us that this isn’t how dispositions
work. Given full information, they might point out, one would retain dispositions to
apply the expressions (albeit dispositions to apply the terms only in circumstances
which will never obtain). However, this retort misses the main point I want to make.
The main point I want to make is not that the likelihood of semantic apocalypse ren-
ders all our words meaningless or anything like that. The main point I want to make is
that, given the likelihood of semantic apocalypse under complete information, CIDA
seems to open up a huge undesirable gap between the meaning of our words and our
current state. Our meaning no longer seems to retain any connection to our current
state in any important sense. Of course, it is true that what makes our current expres-
sions empty is the fact that we have dispositions such that given complete information
we would abandon all our current vocabulary. However, I take it that this connection
is not sufficient to appease the intuition that any sensible story about meaning needs
to retain an important connection between the meaning of words as used by S and the
current state of S.
Conclusion
Complete information dispositional metasemantics may have some promising fea-
tures. However, for the moment, it also has some worrying features. A plausible
defence of a complete information metasemantic account needs to address two impor-
tant worries which my discussion has highlighted. I do not assume the worries I have
highlighted are insurmountable or ultimately decisive. However, they do pinpoint two
important theoretical costs which should be borne in mind when assessing the merits
of accounts such as CIDA. The two worries I highlighted are as follows. First, there
seems to be no in principle reason to think that ‘S’s dispositions to apply E given com-
plete information’ picks out a single determinate set of dispositions in the majority
of cases. The proponent of CIDA needs either to bite the bullet and accept that most
of our terms, given CIDA, have indeterminate meanings or else provide some such
principled reason. Second, my discussion of semantic apocalypse seems to suggest
that there could well be quite generally a huge gap between our current tendencies
in using words and the meaning of our words (not just in specific instances). This
seems contrary to the intuitions which provide the motivation for considering dispo-
sitional metasemantics in the first place. So, the proponent of complete information
dispositional metasemantics needs to either (a) demonstrate, in light of the possibil-
ity of semantic apocalypse, that CIDA can nevertheless provide the relevant intuitive
connection between our actual current states and our meanings, or (b) demonstrate
that CIDA is still an attractive view despite its inability to provide such a connection.
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